During an interview with American media personality Tucker Carlson, the Russian president Vladimir Putin claimed that Russia had a claim to Ukraine based on Russia’s historic imperial borders. Many were quick to call out the obvious ridicule behind this statement; one of whom being former Mongolian President Tsakhia Elbegdorj. Elbegdorj made a post on social-media site X showing maps of the former Mongol Empire at its height, when it dwarfed not only the Romans, but even the Russian state at the time. By Putin’s own logic, that would mean that Mongolia had a legitimate claim to a vast portion of Eurasia, including Putin’s own nation.
That post came two years after Elbegdorj had decried the war when it had first broken out. In 2022, Mongolia looked like it would be a firm supporter of Ukraine. It pledged $200,000 in humanitarian aid for Ukraine, saw protests outside the Russian embassy, and accepted Russians fleeing conscription. The plight of the Ukrainian people saw obvious sympathy in Mongolia, a country whose history shared several themes with Ukraine’s.
The broad strokes of each country’s past have several overlaps. Both were territories of larger empires before gaining brief independence in the chaos of the early 20th century. While Mongolia was a nominally independent country throughout the 20th century, its communist dictatorship was firmly in the Soviet bloc, dependent on Moscow for its economy and resources. Both became democracies in regions of authoritarianism, closely safeguarding their independence and autonomy, while having to balance relations with larger, more powerful neighbors. In this way, Mongolia can sympathize with Ukraine’s past and present circumstances.
Yet despite Mongolia’s early support, it has done little for Ukraine since. A lack of material aid can be somewhat explained by Mongolia’s economy. Mongolia’s annual budget hovers around five billion dollars, with a small, albeit growing, military budget. Despite vast mineral wealth, a quarter of the population lives in poverty. Compared to wealthier nations like Germany, Japan or the United States, Mongolia simply has less capability to give.
Still, that doesn’t explain Mongolia’s reluctance to support Ukraine diplomatically. It abstained when the United Nations voted to order Russian forces to withdraw, despite the vast majority of nations being in support of the proposal. To understand this, one has to turn and consider Mongolia’s delicate geopolitical situation.
Sandwiched between Russia to the north and China in the south, Mongolia has to constantly balance the two great empires around it. Its export market is dominated by China, which is the consistent destination of 70-90% of Mongolia’s exports. Russia, meanwhile, buys far less from Mongolia, whose exports are largely material resources that Moscow is already rich in. It does, however, make up 30% of Mongolia’s imports, having a particular chokehold on Mongolia’s petroleum supply.
Beijing’s own stance on Ukraine, which has been dodgy and inconsistent, means that Mongolia has some leeway to do as it wishes with Ukraine without angering China. However, its northern relationship is more difficult. It signed a five-year-deal with Rosneft, a Russian energy company, in 2022. This deal secured a deal on petroleum and diesel fuel until 2027. However, angering Russia too much could risk the pair’s trade relations, which would have a significant impact on Mongolia’s extraction economy that needs fuel to function.
However, Mongolia is not just a victim of Russia’s. It also has its own leverage over the larger country, particularly in its export of resources to China. Vast quantities of petroleum and oil go through Mongolia to reach the Chinese markets. This gives Mongolia potential in any negotiation or conflict with Russia by controlling the route of this trade. For example; Mongolia didn’t include any funding for the Power of Siberia 2 Pipeline in its newest long-term economic plan, which could cause delays. This is a massive blow to Russia, who has depended greatly on trading with China to bypass western sanctions, particularly by exporting fossil fuels to the Chinese market.
Throughout the war, Mongolia has reacted very practically with Russia. It is careful how it treats the nation, without being too hostile. For example, despite being a member of the ICC, Mongolia has agreed to host Vladimir Putin on September 3rd. It will be the first visit to an ICC member-state since they issued an arrest warrant against the leader. It reveals a willingness to work with Russia which, while potentially harmful to the Ukrainian war effort, could actually help forge the path to peace.
Mongolia’s handling of relations with both Russia and Ukraine has made it a potential candidate to facilitate any peace negotiation. Mongolia’s neutral, quiet reputation in the global arena has made it a potential host country for bilateral discussions before. It hosted meetings between North Korea and Japan in 2012 and 2024, and was a potential site for the meeting between President Donald Trump of the US and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un in 2018.
As a close trading partner of Russia, and with a government that has done little to aid Ukraine, Mongolia could have credibility in the eyes of Moscow to host such a negotiation. Meanwhile, as an ex-communist nation who escaped Russian influence in favor of democratic independence, it could hold equal credibility for Kyiv. It may therefore be Mongolia, the country where Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy happened to spend the first five years of his life, who facilitates peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.
[Photo by Nick Farnhill, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Mathew Biadun is a student at Eastern Connecticut State University, studying History and Political-Science.
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