Trump Triumphs: A New Dawn for a U.S.-French Nuclear and Military Alliance Energizing Europe from Ireland to the Urals

With Donald Trump now elected for a second term, there’s a lot to analyze, particularly with respect to how his administration might approach ending the Russia-Ukraine war and recalibrating U.S. relations with Europe, specifically with France.

From a strategic viewpoint, Trump has historically advocated for de-escalation and diplomacy, aiming to broker peace agreements that prioritize American interests while reducing U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts. His approach to the Russia-Ukraine conflict could likely center on high-level negotiations aimed at pressuring both sides toward a ceasefire or peace talks. Trump might leverage economic incentives—potentially reducing sanctions on Russia contingent upon a verifiable de-escalation of military aggression. His goal would be to reestablish stability while avoiding a drawn-out conflict that continues to strain both U.S. resources and global markets. He also wants to avoid a nuclear war which is where Macron and President Biden has had us running towards.

Since the era of Charles de Gaulle, France has navigated its relationship with NATO with a careful, almost philosophical ambivalence—a hesitance rooted in a fierce commitment to autonomy and a belief in France’s singular role within Europe. De Gaulle, who embodied French sovereignty with an almost mythic authority, believed France should stand as master of its own destiny, safeguarding its liberty from any influence that might threaten its unique path—even that of its closest allies. Guided by this principle, France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command, a bold gesture that resonated with the deep chords of French independence and a yearning for a distinct European destiny, one sculpted in the image of French ideals. But this infuriated Americans like myself who were much more concerned at that time in winning the Cold War.

To the brilliant and insufferable de Gaulle, NATO was not simply a military alliance; it posed a subtle risk to European self-determination, a structure in which American influence might eclipse European voices (and it has!). He envisioned a Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals,” a continent anchored by its own strength, unswayed by foreign powers. Yet within this vision of European leadership lay an unspoken truth: when de Gaulle spoke of European leadership, he imagined France at the helm—or, at most, a Franco-German axis, bearing the torch for the continent’s defense and direction.

Despite this grand vision, France has remained reluctant to shoulder the full financial burden of such a role, an irony that underscores the complex legacy of de Gaulle’s ideals. The cost of leadership remains a barrier, a commitment France has yet to fully embrace—except for Le Pen. Yet one wonders: were someone like Marine Le Pen to ascend, with her assertive nationalism, perhaps she would be more willing to meet the monetary demands of de Gaulle’s vision.

Today, France’s cautious stance on NATO endures, deeply influenced by de Gaulle’s legacy, and its leaders remain wary of surrendering this autonomy. Only a Europe united under European—indeed, French—leadership can navigate the unpredictable tides of global power, preserving the essence of de Gaulle’s dream that Europe might stand on its own, sovereign and self-defined, a continent guided by its own vision rather than merely orbiting another’s (American) influence.

Trump’s transactional diplomacy approach would not oppose this vision and would likely promote rallying European allied independence if they agreed to share more responsibility for the region’s security framework. Under his administration, NATO allies, especially France, would be urged to take on a greater share of defense spending and regional conflict resolution efforts. His rationale might be that European nations, particularly those closer to the conflict, should bear the primary responsibility for defense, while the U.S. provides supportive, but not front-line, assistance.

As for relations with France, Trump has often viewed Europe as an important partner but has been vocal about the need for “fair” contributions in defense. He might employ a mix of diplomatic pressure and economic persuasion to encourage France to work more actively with the U.S. on both security and economic cooperation. Trump’s administration might approach France with a trade agenda aimed at bolstering mutual economic benefits while promoting shared interests in energy independence, possibly through liquefied natural gas exports or nuclear technology partnerships.

In terms of broader U.S.-Europe relations, Trump’s “America First” stance would likely remain, but there would likely be recalibrations to prevent any antagonistic tones that may have arisen in his previous administration. A strategic re-approach would aim to fortify partnerships that secure American interests while respecting European autonomy and encouraging a fairer defense burden.

Thus, Trump presidency could signify a renewed push for a practical, results-driven diplomacy that seeks a swift resolution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a reassessment of transatlantic defense responsibilities, and an economic partnership model that benefits both the U.S. and Europe.

What I would like to see between the US and France is for President Trump to deepen U.S.-France cooperation on nuclear energy, leveraging France’s position as a global leader in this field. Trump’s commitment to “energy dominance” could synergize with France’s expertise in nuclear energy to secure energy independence, strengthen national security, and address global energy demands. Such a partnership would not only be economically advantageous but would also create a powerful alliance in advancing clean, reliable energy sources.

France, with over 70% of its electricity generated from nuclear power, is a natural partner for the U.S. in this realm. Trump could approach this collaboration by advocating for joint development of next-generation nuclear technology, including small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced nuclear reactors. SMRs, in particular, offer scalability and safety enhancements, which could accelerate deployment in both nations and globally, addressing energy security in a more decentralized manner. A partnership in this domain would allow the U.S. to benefit from France’s deep expertise, enabling American energy producers to modernize and expand nuclear infrastructure more effectively.

Trump’s administration might also propose an exchange of knowledge and resources for managing nuclear waste—a critical issue that has impeded the expansion of nuclear capabilities in the U.S. France’s advanced reprocessing technology, which recycles spent fuel, could provide invaluable insights to the U.S., where nuclear waste storage remains an ongoing challenge. By collaborating on waste management, the two countries could jointly improve nuclear sustainability, reduce environmental impact, and set global standards in safe nuclear practices.

Beyond technical and environmental advantages, a U.S.-France nuclear alliance would carry substantial economic benefits. Trump could negotiate trade policies to reduce barriers on nuclear technology exports between the two countries, enabling American and French companies to collaborate on projects in emerging markets seeking clean energy solutions. This approach would also create high-skilled jobs in both countries, especially in research, engineering, and manufacturing sectors. Additionally, this collaboration could extend to building nuclear infrastructure in energy-hungry developing nations, further establishing American and French influence in global energy markets while promoting low-carbon energy sources.

On the defense front, enhanced nuclear cooperation could also improve energy resilience within NATO, reinforcing European allies’ energy independence from geopolitically unstable regions. With nuclear energy’s stability and reliability, Europe could reduce its dependence on fossil fuel imports, particularly from Russia, thus bolstering the U.S.-led alliance’s security against external energy threats.

Economically, Trump could frame this partnership as a catalyst for high-skilled job creation, particularly in research, engineering, and manufacturing, in both nations. The benefits could extend to third-party nations, where French and American firms might collaborate to build nuclear infrastructure, thereby exporting stability and clean energy to regions in need. Such initiatives would also deepen American and French influence in emerging markets while promoting low-carbon solutions—an initiative that speaks to a globally sustainable future.

Through economic diplomacy, Trump could deepen France’s commitment to European defense by linking it with shared economic ventures. Unlike past administrations, which often saw NATO contributions as a burden, Trump’s approach might frame them as investments in a united and resilient Europe. By positioning nuclear energy as a pillar of transatlantic security, Trump could address De Gaulle’s lingering caution regarding American influence in European affairs. As philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre observed, freedom is defined not just by liberation but by constructive autonomy—a principle that Trump could echo by reinforcing European self-sufficiency in energy and defense through a U.S.-French partnership.

Trump’s doctrine of “America First” need not signify isolation but rather a pragmatic recalibration that fosters alliances based on mutual strength. With France, the global leader in nuclear energy, Trump would likely pursue a policy grounded in what French philosopher Michel Foucault might term “an economy of power.”

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.