During the Cold War days, India was the vanguard of the non-aligned movement—a neutral position in the ideological conflict of the superpowers. Neither the Cold War days persist nor bipolarity nor the same superpower arrangement continue to this day. The post-Cold War 21st-century world reflects multipolarity in a competitive global order. Since 2014, India’s foreign policy has undergone a significant shift amidst the swift geopolitical alteration that is all-encompassing across the globe. In such a global environment, the Indian foreign policy wants to restructure how India engages with the rest of the world and eventually become more assertive.
The recently concluded 22nd India-Russia annual summit held on 8-9 July 2024, for which Prime Minister Modi visited Moscow, was keenly watched by observers across the globe. This meeting was very noteworthy for a gamut of reasons. This annual summit has been pending for the last three years and this is the first time that Narendra Modi and Vladimir Putin have met each other after the Ukraine invasion. However, there are primarily three critical reasons behind this meeting which holds immense importance: first, a warm relationship with Moscow will act as a means to avert any scope of a growing Sino-Russian alliance; second, to bury the brewing broad perception amongst Russians and even Indians that India-Russia ties were drifting apart, and finally to assert to the world that Indian foreign policy is driving on the idea of strategic autonomy.
Preventing Sino-Russian bonhomie
Both India and Russia advocate a multipolar global order and a multipolar Asia sans a hegemon. In the last few years, particularly during the Ukraine War, relations between China and Russia have grown substantially. An absolute Russian embrace of the Chinese strategic vision cannot be afforded to India’s strategic thinking. Hence, more isolation of Russia augments its chances of developing a deeper Chinese penchant. The intermittent border clashes with China in the last few years, deteriorating Russian military and economic competence, and the probable irreparable Russian entanglement into the Chinese strategic encirclement have compelled India to further nourish close ties with Russia notwithstanding the US coercion to condemn Russia in the Ukraine War.
In 2022, China and Russia declared sharing a ‘no-limits partnership’. At this point, China is Russia’s largest trading partner and there is a growing dependency of the latter on China for economic assistance as Western sanctions due to the Ukraine War continues to loom large. Also, Russia has to continue the war. There is factual proof that India has benefitted from the war in Ukraine – 357 crude oil shipments with an average per barrel price of USD 78 reached India in the nearly nine months between the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the introduction of the price cap. Even if this is considered a situational benefit for New Delhi, her long-term dependency on Moscow revolves around its defence systems, knowledge transfer and maintenance. India is the world’s leading importer of Russian arms, the sheer bulk of arms sales and Russia’s readiness to deliver weapons systems and technologies that no other strategic partner will offer to India, make Russia a key player in India’s strategic thinking. Regarding defence knowledge transfer, India knows well that the Americans will never be a key partner.
In the background of such compulsions, the intensifying Sino-Russia strategic partnership to counter a common adversary, the US, and the concern that Russia could become a junior partner to China, having access to significant military hardware and securing Russia’s neutral position in the contingency of any confrontation between India and China alarms India. India, therefore, found this Modi-Putin meeting as an opportune moment to avert this growing bonhomie between the two communist states.
Public perception building
While Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Moscow was profoundly observed by the West, the meeting was momentous for clearing the mist of perception that has settled over India-Russia relations. The domestic perception of both countries reflected doubt regarding the fate of India-Russia relations. There were some very critical moments noted during this visit that redefined the India-Russia strategic partnership – Putin’s greetings to Modi as ‘my dear friend’ and conferring him with Russia’s highest civilian honour, the Order of St Andrew the Apostle, for his exceptional civilian and military merit. Prime Minister Modi was previously recognised with this award in 2019 for his ‘exceptional services’ in encouraging the special and privileged strategic partnership between India and Russia and nurturing friendly ties between the people of both countries. This recognition stands furthermore significant as it was previously conferred to Central Asian and Chinese heads of state such as the first President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, the former President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev, and China Premier Xi Jinping. The 2024 recognition comes at a critical juncture when the Ukraine War is on and the relations between the West and Russia have substantially decayed.
Putin’s welcoming of the Indian Prime Minister at his home in Novo-Ogaryovo could also be considered a subtle move to reassure the Russian people of the warm ties that not only persist between the two countries but also a reflection of how closely the two leaders function. Both leaders want to craft a public perception of the persistent and strengthened strategic partnership between India and Russia. Nine MoUs and agreements were signed in different sectors, including trade, climate and research, underscoring the deepened ties between the two countries.
Advocating strategic autonomy
India is an advocate of multipolarity in the present-day world. Nevertheless, multipolarity or the multipolar world features competition, brewing tension and conflicts. India, in contemporary times, has attained a global position to reckon with; she has gained a position where other global powers consider India’s contributory role in global issues. Thus, by attaining such a global position, India has drifted much apart from the policy of non-alignment and has been speaking of strategic autonomy.
India is well aware that to resist China, it needs both the United States and Russia. Thus, a tightrope walk to balance both and not offend any of them has been of critical importance to India. India knows how vital Russia is for her geopolitical and geostrategic interests in Central Asia and Russia’s Far East, especially with the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). With regards to the US, India shares a strategic partnership and the present Modi regime has been West-oriented but as a matter of fact, the US shares a very transactional relationship with India as opposed to how India-Russia relations have panned out over all these decades.
This meeting was, hence, a potential signal to the other powers, particularly the United States that India has left the path of non-alignment and has been pursuing a policy of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. India promotes mutually exclusive partnerships with all its partners and allies. India knows well that strategic autonomy is its best bet in this changing global order.
Indian foreign policy operates in a volatile international order where continental Europe is witnessing a war, deteriorating relations and simmering tensions between the West and Russia, escalating Sino-US tension, China’s assertive role in the South China Seas and largely in Asia and much more. Amidst such challenging times, India aims to put up with its varied interests including aspirations for global status and countering China for which it needs the West; economic growth, which would be possible with Russian energy resources; maintaining her impartial leadership position in the global South, and so on. This meeting between Modi and Putin serves important foreign policy goals of India. It needs to be observed how the Ukraine War pans out and what role India plays and thereafter the global developments that could change the current course of the international system.
[Photo by Prime Minister’s Office, India, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
The author is a Doctoral Research Scholar in International Relations at Jadavpur University, India. Currently, she is working on India-Russia Strategic Relations. Previously, she has been a Fellow at the University Grants Commission, Government of India.
