An 8 July 2024 BBC paper had this alarming title : “ECOWAS risks disintegration if juntas quit”. The juntas in question are the regimes of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger that came to power successively between August 2020 and July 2024.
The three countries have been historically close both culturally and economically for several decades. In December 1970 already, following a recommendation of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the United Nations Development Program for the collaborative management of their huge reserves in mining, water resources and agriculture, they decided to form a regional association named Autorité du Liptako-Gourma (Liptako-Gourma Authority). It was a transnational entity covering 370,000 square kilometers, which is larger than Japan, Germany or Finland. In November 2011, the Authority’s geographic scope and mandate were expanded to encompass the entire territory of the three states, approximately 2 781 200 square kilometers.
After the 26 July, 2024 coup d’état in Niger, the relations between the three countries and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) became very tense, especially when the regional organization threatened military action if Niger’s civilian president, Mohammed Bazoum, was not immediately restored to his functions. Stringent economic sanctions followed, hurting mostly the civilian population, since they disrupted the supply of electric power from neighboring Nigeria and the flow of medicines.
Mali and Burkina Faso immediately came to the rescue of Niger and all three joined forces. They created the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel, or AES) in September 2023 and, as the crisis deepened, announced their intention to withdraw from ECOWAS with immediate effect on 28 January.
The sudden announcement of the collective decision to leave the bloc was initially met with disbelief, followed by shock, and ultimately, panic, as the ECOWAS Commission scrambled to backtrack, by lifting sanctions and sending emissaries to the secessionist states. On July 7, 2024 at its 65th ordinary session held in Abuja (Nigeria), the regional body designated the presidents of Senegal, Bassirou Diomaye Faye and of Togo, Faure Gnassingbé, as ECOWAS facilitators in the organization’s engagements with the AES.
Notably, the day before, the AES had officially become the Confederation of Sahel States (Confédération des États du Sahel – CES). Although the members of the CES vowed that their decision to leave ECOWAS is final and irrevocable, the door remains open. Indeed, the Senegalese president has already visited two of the breakaway countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, in an unofficial peacebuilding mission.
What could ECOWAS bring to the negotiating table to make the CES countries want to reconsider and engage in further negotiations? In seemingly unsolvable situations, making the other party an attractive offer can be an effective strategy setting the stage for a win-win scenario while building goodwill and trust. In their 1994 book, Negotiating Rationally, Max Bazerman and Margaret Neale advocate for understanding the other party’s interests and making offers that create value for both sides.
The main grievances that the CES has against the regional organization are, first, that ECOWAS failed to support Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger vigorously enough in their fight against terrorism; second, they claim that the organization is under the influence of foreign powers, especially France. The final complaint is that ECOWAS has lost its way and forgotten about the spirit of Pan-Africanism of the early years.
Presidents Faye and Gnassingbé may consider making the CES three offers in areas of common concern, which also address their main grievances.
One proposal might be to grant the CES conditional recognition, pending the formation of a government for the confederation. This will make the argument that the ECOWAS is slowly disintegrating because of the creation of the CES, lose relevance. Also, potentially recognizing an entity that is openly anti-French and anti-colonial would significantly raise the credibility of ECOWAS and therefore greatly facilitate its negotiations efforts.
A second offer could be to invite the CES to join the discussions around the creation of a West African currency, the ECO. Since the CES is just starting studying the feasibility of a new currency, now may be the right time for ECOWAS to step in with a constructive offer, showing that they do want to help the Sahel countries get rid of neo-colonial ties. The status of the ECO was mentioned in paragraphs 11 to 13 of the press release for the 7 July Abuja meeting.
The third constructive offer addresses issues of poverty, violence and unemployment. It concerns a 2018 ECOWAS project for a regional automotive industry. Including the CES into a vast industrial initiative of that nature could be a means to tackle terrorism through the creation of income-generating activities. More generally, the lack of sustainable regional value chains, especially in manufacturing, is a serious development problem that the ECOWAS mediators could turn into an opportunity in their discussions with the CES.
On the African continent, the three biggest players in the automotive industry are South Africa, Morocco, and Egypt. They are far ahead of West Africa, where there are only a few car manufacturers mostly from Nigeria and Ghana. Given the size of the ECOWAS bloc with a population of 400 million, there is significant room for growth, especially in the promotion of industry-specific skills, such as spare parts manufacturing, electrical and other technical skills.
[Header image by Carport, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Eric Tevoedjre comes from Benin (West Africa). His research focuses on Regional integration in Africa, especially the Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS). He received his doctorate in International Relations from The Johns Hopkins University.
