At the start of this year, on Jan. 29, the Taliban-led Afghan government held an international summit in Kabul called the ‘Regional Cooperation Initiative’. Several of Afghanistan’s neighbors attended, including Turkey, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and most importantly of all, China. The next day, Chinese President Xi Jinping accepted the diplomatic credentials of Bilal Karimi; previously an official Taliban spokesman, and now the Afghan ambassador to China. This move represented the newest in a series of growing ties between Beijing and Kabul; a series that had been in the works for years.
As America’s 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan neared, China had been quick to meet with the Taliban, welcoming a regime that they (as would turn out to be correct) saw as inevitable. The foreign minister of China, Wang Yi, had met with high-level Taliban leaders in Tianjin in July of 2021. Even before the Taliban had taken over, bilateral dialogue had begun.
A year later, Wang Yi again met with Taliban officials, this time in Afghanistan itself. That meeting was followed up by an international meeting, organized and hosted by China in the city of Tianxi. This meeting, called “Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan Plus Afghanistan”, was attended by ministers from Qatar, Indonesia, Afghanistan and China. It was a small group; but one that would grow in the years to come.
The start of 2023 was marked by an incredible bilateral trade agreement. China’s ‘Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co’ signed an oil-extraction deal with Afghanistan, promising to invest hundreds of million dollars year-after-year. Economics proved to be a significant motivator in growing the bilateral relationship, as Taliban officials expressed plans that October to join China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative, an economic grouping comprised of around 150 countries.
China’s ally Russia has similarly moved to grow ties, although at a slower pace. Taliban has attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum for several years now, followed by hints to remove the Taliban from Russia’s list of banned terrorist organizations. That hasn’t yet happened, and Russia hasn’t moved to officially resume ties either as China has. However, it represents an openness within Moscow to build a rapport with the Taliban regime.
However, China has seen difficulties in its attempts to grow ties. China has only delivered a third of the investment promised in that oil-extraction deal. Additionally, there have been fights between Afghanistan and other Chinese allies. Pakistan and Afghanistan are still fighting to this day, for example. Border clashes erupted between Iran and Afghanistan in 2023, and there are obvious ideological differences between the radical Shia government of the Ayatollah, and the radical Sunni government of the Taliban. Similar differences exist between Afghanistan and China itself, as China oppresses other Muslims in its own lands.
Regardless of the difficulties, however, there is obvious incentive to overcome them. With Afghanistan being the only country in the world to simultaneously border China, Pakistan and Iran, it serves as a vital bridge in the region. But that bridge is one that can risk Chinese investment; for example, a terrorist cell based in Afghanistan that killed several Chinese workers in Pakistan this May. Transforming Afghanistan into an ally – one that will cooperate with regional alliances and help foster economic ties – would be an obvious advantage to Beijing.
Seeing this obvious advantage, one may expect that the United States would want to prevent such a relationship from burgeoning. But no such action has happened. Washington’s policy towards Afghanistan, as opposed to the evolving policies of Russia and China, has been frozen and confused ever since its evacuation almost three years ago.
The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan left the United States unsure how to proceed. It remains as morally and ideologically opposed to the Taliban regime as ever, as the Taliban continues to commit human rights violations, particularly against women and political prisoners. However, the United States still aims to protect the Afghan people, despite their new overlords.
This mixed goal has resulted in what the State Department calls a ‘pragmatic relationship’. The United States trades openly with Afghanistan, in an aim to prevent an economic collapse that may hurt the Afghan people. However, it refuses to officially communicate with or recognize the Taliban, using Qatar as a middle man for the diplomatic activities it no longer operates in Afghanistan, such as consular services for American citizens. It has also engaged in combative behavior as well, such as freezing seven billion dollars of Afghan assets.
This hasn’t succeeded. The Taliban economy is still stagnant, with exports contracting, with the end result likely to raise food prices. The human rights situation has seen no signs of improvement. America has tried this middle ground approach, neither fully attacking nor fully engaging Afghanistan, with no visible benefit to show from it.
Washington’s goal reflects an outdated hope for the status of Afghanistan; that the Taliban and Afghanistan can be separated. America, unlike countries like Turkey or China, has not accepted the fundamental reality on the ground. The Taliban and Afghanistan have become one in the same, no matter how America feels about it.
In some ways, it’s understandable why America’s policy has been frozen. The same administration that evacuated Afghanistan is still in power. The next administration, whether under Donald Trump or Kamala Harris, will be led by someone who either negotiated the withdrawal or was involved in its execution. It is difficult for whomever is in charge to reapproach the Taliban, without having to address their part in allowing the takeover.
Foreign policy, however, does not wait for domestic politics. The longer America waits, the closer China and Afghanistan become. The United States must engage Afghanistan on some capacity, or allow a dangerous rogue state to join forces with an even more dangerous rival.
America can approach the Taliban slowly. The first step will not immediately be rapprochement. Rather, to use another French word, it will be a réouverture, or reopening. A reopening of the closed door between the two, to allow for conversation to begin. Such a reopening can be accomplished by cooperating to build a capacity for bilateral dialogue.
For example, cooperating with the Taliban on shared goals, such as humanitarian aid or building infrastructure. This can be justified to the American people and the global community as helping the suffering Afghan people, while also building up goodwill between the two nations, and providing an economic competitor against Chinese investment. If Afghanistan risks significant economic investment, it may think twice against allying with China.
Another point could be to help the Taliban fight against the ISKP, the Islamic State’s branch in Afghanistan. The Islamic State is now a shared enemy of the US and Afghanistan; and little does better do bring enemies together than a common foe. Providing American intelligence, and perhaps even air support, against the ISKP could be another way to build a relationship with Afghanistan.
Equally important as creating ties between America and Afghanistan is creating wedges between America and Chinese allies. . Fostering conflict between Islamabad, Tehran and Kabul will be just as detrimental to China as fostering collaboration between Washington and Kabul. Afghanistan’s benefit to America, being a bulwark against the Chinese bloc, can aid the American-Afghan relationship if Afghanistan fears that same bloc. Making China a security-concern would be a major motivator for Afghanistan to cooperate with the United States.
To be sure, this reopening will have its opposition. Many will attack the reopening as a moral failing and a betrayal to the Afghan people. However, just like many foreign policy decisions, it will be just as important to market the policy as it will be to carry it out. The American government will have to admit that the current policy is failing and, short of another regime-change invasion, Washington has to engage with Afghanistan to accomplish anything. Just like reengagement with Vietnam was built on cooperation with POW/MIA soldiers, until the Vietnamese regime moderated, America can work with the Afghan government on humanitarian projects and counter-terrorism, until another option presents itself.
A Sino-Afghan alliance is budding, and unless America acts, it will blossom into a dangerous partnership. America should take steps to engage Afghanistan on common ground, and create fractures in the common ground it shares with America’s enemies. This is the only true way America can prevent a Sino-Afghan alliance.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Mathew Biadun is a student at Eastern Connecticut State University, studying History and Political-Science.
