India’s overseas coverage typically recedes amidst the fervour of basic elections, yet glimpses of it arise in the very carefully crafted manifestos of political get-togethers. Nevertheless, the persistent hole among rhetoric and motion continues to be a defining characteristic of governance, though the BJP-led NDA governing administration in New Delhi aims to alter this narrative. International relations, a critical realm of India’s policy routine, finds its contours shaped by the complex dynamics of diplomacy, particularly concerning India’s neighbours. The hard obstacle of neighbouring relations has prolonged bedevilled India’s international policy landscape, with China and Myanmar also sharing borders compounding the tests in the location. Observers have noted a tumultuous path in the Narendra Modi government’s ‘neighbourhood policy’ more than the earlier 10 years, fraught with conflicts and setbacks, reflecting the shifting geopolitical condition in the location.
Strains in the Neighbourhood
Amidst India’s assertive posturing on the global phase – from its significant function in the G-twenty last year to crafting nuanced insurance policies for the Arctic and Antarctic – strains in its speedy neighbourhood increase pertinent concerns. Current episodes, this kind of as India’s defence minister’s posture on Pakistan, tensions with the Maldives, and the untimely projection of the Katchatheevu challenge (with Sri Lanka), indicated slipups in New Delhi’s diplomatic finesse, inviting criticism of immature maneuvering. All this took place at a critical time of the Modi authorities completing its tenth year in office environment and dealing with the six-week-extensive normal election.
In an endeavor to recalibrate relations, the Modi authorities experienced recalibrated the “neighbourhood-first policy,” a decade again, aimed at fostering friendship and enhancing trade with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, while the extent of China’s involvement appeared obscure. Though several memoranda of knowledge have been inked, spanning domains like education, healthcare, agriculture, and trade, tangible results remained elusive amid the churn of bilateral disputes and protection issues. The spectre of border skirmishes, notably in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh with China, and recurrent clashes along the Line of Manage (LoC) with Pakistan, forged a pall over diplomatic overtures, undermining aspirations for substantive regional cooperation. So, when the Modi authorities espoused a eyesight of a ‘neighbourhood-friendly’ South Asia, the ground fact signalled a much more arduous journey toward acknowledging this lofty ambition.
Dynamics with Pakistan
In the first times of Modi’s tenure, there emerged promising indicators of a thaw in relations with Pakistan, epitomized by the ‘Sari-Scarf diplomacy’ and the camaraderie amongst Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi. The latter’s impromptu go to to Lahore in 2015 captured world-wide focus, even though it stirred unease among the Pakistan’s military and spiritual echelons. Nonetheless, this possible amity was short-lived.
The trajectory shifted considerably in September 2016, spoiled by a terrorist assault on an Indian army base in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir, boasting the lives of 19 soldiers. India pointed fingers at Pakistan-centered militants, igniting a flare-up in tensions and dashing hopes for bilateral dialogue. The fallout from Uri reverberated across the region, casting a shadow in excess of the 19th SAARC Summit slated for Pakistan, ultimately top to its postponement. The Pulwama terror attack in February 2019, ensuing in the tragic loss of forty Indian paramilitary personnel, precipitated a swift retaliatory airstrike by India on alleged terror camps in Pakistan’s Balakot region, escalating hostilities and further more impeding potential customers for regional cooperation. Subsequent conclusions by the Modi federal government, like the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s unique standing under Article 370 in August 2019, exacerbated tensions and introduced bilateral trade to a grinding halt. However, the latest remarks by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, seemingly endorsing reports of Indian businesses utilizing mercenary agents to neutralize Pakistan-primarily based terrorists, have more infected tensions. Pakistan’s vehement reaction to Singh’s assertion indicated the precarious point out of bilateral relations, marred by mistrust and mutual recriminations.
In the meantime, the latest improve in government in Pakistan has signalled a tentative fascination in revitalizing nominal trade ties, viewed as a indicates to resuscitate the faltering Pakistani overall economy. Understandably, with elections looming, the Modi administration has been careful in its reaction to these overtures.
Relations with Bhutan and Nepal
In the course of Modi’s early tenure, India’s focus on nurturing relations with South Asian Himalayan nations around the world like Bhutan and Nepal encountered both of those progress and pitfalls. Opting for Bhutan as his inaugural overseas go to, Modi pressured the importance of these ties. Subsequent visits to neighbouring nations, barring the Maldives owing to domestic upheavals, signalled a concerted exertion to bolster regional cooperation.
Yet, amidst endeavours at cooperation, discord persisted. Border demarcation difficulties, significantly regarding certain unmarked parts alongside the India-Bhutan border, remained unresolved, leaving potential flashpoints ripe for exploitation, primarily in the context of China’s strategic manoeuvres. China’s alleged encroachment together the India-Bhutan-China border in 2017, coupled with India’s counter-deployment, escalated tensions and complicated an presently delicate condition. The spectre of a strategic partnership concerning China and Pakistan, manifested by the Belt-Street Initiative, further strained India’s relations with its neighbours.
Bhutan, traditionally aligned with India, started to assert its sovereignty, signalling a departure from previous treaties and pursuing broader global engagements. This change, coupled with Nepal’s evolving political landscape and growing proximity to China, stirred apprehensions in India and its Himalayan diplomacy. The Doklam standoff in 2017 was an case in point of the complexities of regional dynamics. Bhutan’s fears over Chinese encroachments intersected with India’s strategic interests, culminating in a extended standoff with considerably-achieving implications for regional security and border disputes.
India’s vigilance over strategic chokepoints like the ‘Chicken Neck’ and its intervention in Doklam pointed to its strategic imperatives, albeit with repercussions on regional steadiness. As China’s impact looms substantial in South Asia, India set by itself to start a fragile balancing act, safeguarding its pursuits though averting regional destabilization.
The discord involving India and Nepal achieved its lowest stage next Nepal’s adoption of a new constitution in 2015, which India contested. The subsequent sanctions imposed by India, culminating in a crippling blockade, exposed the asymmetrical energy dynamics concerning larger and smaller sized neighbours, prompting Nepal to take a look at alternatives, notably nearer ties with China. The design of a contentious street linking Uttarakhand with the disputed Lipulekh Pass in Could 2020 further exacerbated tensions, leading to border skirmishes and straining bilateral relations. India’s porous borders with Nepal and Bhutan, whilst facilitating totally free movement, also pose stability challenges, with India alleging exploitation by anti-Indian features and terrorists.
Strains with China and Sri Lanka
Originally, the Modi authorities sought to bolster trade and economic relations with China. Nevertheless, escalating conflicts with neighbouring international locations, which includes Bhutan, Nepal, and Pakistan, precipitated a shift. Border tensions in Ladakh since Could 2020, culminating in clashes at the Galwan Valley, highlighted the complexities of managing border disputes. In point, both of those nations vied for infrastructure growth together the Line of Real Control (LAC), with India’s design of a new highway triggering the June 2020 clash. Higher-degree military services conversations among India and China aimed at resolving border challenges in eastern Ladakh because the Galwan face-off in 2020 have found constrained progress. These talks have principally focused on pursuing comprehensive disengagement in the remaining friction areas together the Line of Precise Control (LAC) with the target of upholding ‘peace and tranquillity’ on the ground. On February 19, the 21st spherical of India-China corps commander degree meeting took place at the Chushul-Moldo border. Throughout this assembly, the Indian side reaffirmed its position on resolving the remaining friction factors at Depsang and Demchok right before in search of normalization in bilateral relations between the two nations around the world.
Inspite of negotiations, tensions persisted, erupting into clashes near the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh in December 2022. China’s ongoing opposition to India’s stance on Arunachal Pradesh was again exposed by experiences of renaming thirty places together the border, prompting a potent rebuke from India’s Ministry of External Affairs. Amidst this backdrop, the location continues to be entangled in a precarious problem showing the fragility of regional stability.
The marriage among India and Sri Lanka has endured its share of trials and tribulations, especially regarding the Tamil difficulty and maritime disputes. Early interventions in the Tamil conflict by successive Indian administrations were fulfilled with scepticism by Sri Lanka right up until the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 and the subsequent deployment of the Indian peacekeeping power altered dynamics. Even so, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi precipitated a basic change in India’s method, main to a recalibration of relations concentrating on financial and trade issues even though eschewing interference in inside affairs.
Even so, India’s response to the Rajapaksa regime’s handling of the Tamil difficulty in 2008-09 was not widely appreciated, balancing political pressures from Tamil Nadu with strategic considerations. Even though the plight of Northeastern Tamils drew notice, the grievances of Tamils of the latest Indian origin received comparatively a lot less observe. The Tamil diaspora’s emotional ties to Tamil Nadu and the influx of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees confirmed the complexities of the problem, with lingering uncertainties about India’s sincerity in searching for a tranquil resolution.
Meanwhile, the recurring arrests of Indian fishermen by the Sri Lankan Navy more strained bilateral ties, exacerbating tensions more than maritime boundaries and humanitarian worries. In spite of (1974 and 1976) treaties delineating boundaries and stipulating humane cure, successive administrations in each international locations failed to handle this concern proficiently. It was in this context that the controversy bordering the Katchatheevu Island concern fuelled political posturing, with statements by Indian leaders frequently viewed via the lens of electoral politics, significantly in Tamil Nadu. Sri Lankan media criticism and opposition scrutiny included gasoline to the hearth, exacerbating tensions. Even with these troubles, the two nations identify the importance of continued cooperation, specially in situations of disaster. The reluctance to antagonize every other is viewed in the context of India’s help through Sri Lanka’s money distress, highlighting the absence of choice benefactors in periods of require.
Issues in the Maldives and Bangladesh
Throughout this period, India’s relations with the Maldives, normally known as a tropical paradise, soured significantly under President Muhammed Muizzu’s administration, characterised by anti-India rhetoric and a pro-China stance. Muizzu’s need for the withdrawal of Indian troops by March fifteen, 2024, sparked popular protests, exacerbating tensions. The Modi government’s before criticism of Muizzu’s anti-India remarks, coupled with controversies bordering Lakshadweep, further strained bilateral ties, fuelling fears about getting rid of still yet another welcoming ally in the location.
Conversely, India’s relations with Bangladesh have seen some progress, marked by compromises on border demarcation, albeit difficulties stay, significantly concerning river drinking water sharing. Having said that, in 2015, India and Bangladesh signed an settlement to simplify their four,000-km border and clarify the identities of fifty two,000 persons residing in enclaves, resolving a four-ten years-aged difficulty. The offer, at first proposed in 1974, concerned swapping two hundred small enclaves, improving residing disorders for their inhabitants. Every region would think management over most enclaves inside of its territory, granting people the alternative to remain or shift across the border. Explained as a ‘historic milestone,’ the agreement signified a breakthrough in the romance amongst the two international locations. Even at this time, Bangladesh’s rising ties with China and inner anti-India sentiments posed considerations, notwithstanding the frequently professional-India stance of the Sheikh Hasina administration, positioning Bangladesh as a crucial player in India’s ‘Act East’ policy.
Engagement with Myanmar and Afghanistan
Myanmar retains strategic importance for India as a gateway to Southeast Asia, fostering possibilities for maritime cooperation and financial collaboration. India’s proactive engagement with Myanmar is perceived as a counterbalance to China’s growing affect in the region, while worries persist in decreasing China’s sway and addressing ethical challenges emerging from Myanmar’s internal conflicts and human legal rights abuses, notably involving the military.
In the meantime, India’s traditionally heat relations with Afghanistan encounter uncertainty subsequent the resurgence of the Taliban. Diplomatic ties have dwindled, and uncertainties will linger till the Taliban receives official recognition. India’s humanitarian help stays confined amid evolving political dynamics, indicating the fragile stability among regional steadiness and India’s strategic pursuits.
Conclusion: Challenges to Regional Diplomacy
In sum, fostering a harmonious and amicable neighbourhood necessitates India to prioritize the establishment of a stable and peaceful regional purchase. Central to this endeavour is the essential for democratic engagement with neighbouring nations, irrespective of their sizing or stature. India’s erstwhile ‘big brother’ technique has usually bred suspicion and unease between its neighbours, necessitating a departure from interfering in their inner affairs and refraining from remarks that encroach upon their sovereignty.
A proactive stance in addressing rising regional difficulties, coupled with a concerted exertion to avert minimal difficulties from escalating, is paramount. Aligning regional financial procedures with inherent geographical strengths can additional bolster cohesion and cooperation. The revitalization of SAARC, regardless of India’s historic reservations, serves as a probable system for this sort of endeavours.
Still, addressing the complexity of interactions within the neighbourhood demands diplomatic finesse, provided the inherent pattern of ‘love-hate’ dynamics amid neighbouring nations. Though Primary Minister Narendra Modi lauds India’s diplomatic strides and the transformative likely of decisions designed at worldwide summits like the G-twenty, the idea that India alone can reshape the world purchase amidst its geopolitical worries is an overstatement. Former Primary Minister Dr Manmohan Singh as soon as remarked: “The actual examination of India’s overseas coverage is working with neighbours.” If India aspires to foster a neighbourhood characterised by peace, prosperity, and balance, it will have to chart a new course absent from conventional methods, embracing a democratic and inclusive approach to regional diplomacy.
[Photo by Prime Minister’s Office, India]
The sights and views expressed in this report are all those of the author.
K.M. Seethi is ICSSR Senior Fellow and the Academic Advisor of the Worldwide Centre for Polar Experiments at Mahatma Gandhi College, Kerala. He also served as Senior Professor and Dean of Global Relations at MGU.
